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ABSTRACT: Micro SATs and Mini SATs utility/ mission capabilities continue to advance well beyond
academic projects and technology demonstrators. Sophisticated payloads with complex mission data are
becoming the program drivers, complimented with the concepts of satellite swarms and low cost launch
vehicles. All this is evidence for a strong future in the use of this technology. The bad news is that this
growing success will make it a target for sinister exploitation. The un-thinkable happened in September 2001
when commercial aviation assets were highjacked and turned into weapons of mass destruction. Can this
happen to our SPACE assets? This paper explores the implications of necessary security architectures
applicable to satellite technology. An introduction to information assurance requirements is presented
including the NSA certification process details. If it is a classified mission, these requirements are required by
law. If it is in SPACE, these requirements may be our only defense in preventing a space Pearl Harbor. Cost
effectiveness is achieved by taking information assurance issues upfront and designing them in as apposed to
adding later. This paper will introduce the latest information assurance issues and direct readers to
numerous web sites for more details and guidance on requirements, best practice, and the governing laws.

INTRODUCTION
From the Congressional Transcripts of the Senate
Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
FY2007 Budget: Military Space Programs, the
honorable Ronald Sega, Undersecretary of the Air
Force and DoD executive agent for space stated:
“ … small satellites and a subset of those
are TacSats, will be part of our future
going forward.”
Offered as part of the “back to basics” approach
the DoD and the Air Force is taking to get space
acquisitions back on track includes making use of
small satellite technology as quicker and cheaper
where appropriate. It doesn’t get any better than
that for creating new market opportunities other
than declaring it law. But, what comes with this
declaration is the burden of attention, or better
said, becoming a target for someone or some
government alternative agenda. You might still
feel that space is hard to get to and access is very
expensive. These two attributes historically have
been our sense of security. Taylor Dinerman,
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author and journalist wrote for The Space
Review, March 13, 2006:
“The biggest space targets for terrorists
are here on earth. Ground control stations,
industrial sites, and even critical individuals are
all possible targets for terrorists who want to
disrupt satellite operations.”
Matthew Hoey wrote earlier in the year, February
27, 2006; Military Space Systems: the road ahead
“The combination of affordable, shortnotice launch capabilities with small satellite
technology has the potential to revolutionize the
space industry, especially military space systems.”
With all this publicity, being in the news and
building expectations that this technology is ready
for prime time suggests we had better start
thinking about the unthinkable. That is to say,
how should we design our small satellite systems
such that they can never be used against us or in
ways that were never intended. That is what
Information Assurance is all about.
20th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

INFORMATION ASSURANCE HAS ITS OWN
VOCABULARY
Anytime we begin the study of a new subject it is
inevitable that begin with unique vocabulary. IA
is no exception. The Holy Grail is shown below in
Table 1.

IF THE GOVERNMENT WILL OWN OR
CONTROL SPACE SYSTEMS, THEN IA IS
THE LAW.
Department of Defense DIRECTIVE 8581.1 E is
the Information Assurance (IA) Policy for Space
Systems used by the Department of Defense.
Section 4.1 clearly states:

Table 1 - IA unique vocabulary
“4.1 All DoD-owned or controlled space systems
shall meet the following systems specific IA
requirements regardless of mission assurance
category (MAC) or classification.
4.1.2 IA shall be applied in a balanced manner by
performing Information System Security
Engineering (ISSE) as an integral part of the
space system architecture and system engineering
process to address all IA requirements in the
intended operational environment.
4.1.3 The command links to DoD-owned or
controlled space platforms shall be encrypted and
authenticated on an end-to-end basis using
National Security Agency (NSA)-approved
cryptography.

These seven definitions are the fundamental basis
for all information security principles. The trick is
the application of security policies, enforcement of
those policies and the use of various technologies
for defense in depth. Defense in depth is mandated
by DoD as the main IA implementation strategy to
be used to protect national security systems and
information. This approach emphasizes the
construction of successive layers of defense to
protect against attacks. NSA is responsible for
providing guidance regarding the appropriate
combination and implementation of government
and commercial IA-related products in national
security systems.
IA IS ABOUT HOW PARANOID, NOT IF YOU
ARE PARANOID
Try a little experiment sometime. While in front of
your car go up to a perfect stranger and give them
the keys to your car, then just walk away. How do
you feel ? That feeling is a certain level of
paranoia. If you actually refuse to do it, you are
qualified to study IA. What keeps you up at night?
Mission details, technical challenges, schedules,
budgets, people? Well, it should be whether you
are paranoid enough.
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4.1.4 Data generated onboard space platforms
(e.g. telemetry and mission data) shall be end-toend encrypted using NSA-approved
cryptography.”
IT IS JUST A MICRO SATELITE.
As the utility value of Small Satellite technology
grows so does the awareness of them. We tend to
view the technology as an alternative to traditional
space missions that provide complimentary utility
as apposed to disruptive technology. Successful
implementation of lower cost access to space and
responsive space processes will fuel the much
anticipated exploitation of Small Satellites.
However, it is not just the out of the box thinking
on how this technology can be used to solve
complex mission scenarios, but rather the fact that
they are there and therefore, others will try to
exploit them for their own agenda in ways the
originators never dreamed of. Information
Assurance designed in will be the only defense
against such exploitations. It is the intention of IA
designers to make systems secure end to end and
as transparent to the user as possible. The
technical mission challenges and details tend to
over shadow the particulars of IA and budget
dollars are too thin to support what may be
perceived as non-value added. Again, careful
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consideration to the total lifecycle costs must be
made to determine the level of risk to accept
verses investing in IA risk reduction. Then again,
how do you value the risk of highjacked assets
exploited as weapons of mass destruction?

the help of an IA expert that has done this before
to reduce the risk and cost of approval in a timely
fashion.

Bottom line is that the world has changed
significantly in that each of us can no longer just
accept the risk. Therefore, mitigating the risk
requires the best possible designs that offer a
multi-layered defense that is maintained
throughout the development and mission
operations through de-orbit. This means that the
system must be certified and accredited.

At this point it is all about learning what
Information Assurance is and how to do it. The
subject matter is not standard curriculum in our
systems engineering classes (but should be). So,
where do you go to get more guidance? The
Systems Engineering level is a good place to begin.
Numerous Web sites are available from agencies,
industry, and educational institutions, should you
choose to go it alone. I offer the following as a
starting point:

MORE 8581.1 E
“4.1.10 DoD – owned or controlled space systems
shall undergo IA certification and accreditation
(C&A) in accordance with DoD Instructions
5200.40.”
4.1.15. IA shall be a visible element of all space
system investment portfolios. Data shall be
collected to support reporting and IA
management activities across the investment life
cycle.”
CERTIFICATION PROCESS
Certification process is a multi- step process with
many deliverables that all lead up to a Customer
witnessed CV test. DoD 5200.40 is called the “DoD
Information Technology Security Certification
and Accreditation (C & A) Process (DITSCAP)”
December 1997, The domains covered include:
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾

Fail safe design and analysis
Functional Security requirements
Performance Specifications
EMI Control Procedures, tests, reports
TEMPEST Control Plan
Physical Configuration Plans
Audit Reports
Key Management Plan
Final Quadrant Report
Software Version Description
Software Development Plan
In Process Accounting Procedure/Plan
COMSEC Anonymity Plan
Cryptographic Verification Test Plan
Customer Witnessed CV Test
Cryptographic Verification Test report.

IT IS A LICENSE TO LEARN

Information Assurance Technical Framework,
Version 3.1 September 2002
http://www.iatf.net/
Information Security Configuration Guides
http://www.nsa.gov/snac/
DoD Instructions 5200.40 DITSCAP
http://iase.disa.mil/ditscap/DITSCAP.html
DoD Directive 8500.1
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d85
001_102402/d85001p.pdf#search='DoD%208500.1
'
DoD Directive 8581.1 E
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/rtf/d858
11x.rtf
FAQ about 8581.1 E
http://iase.disa.mil/dodd-8581-1e-faq.doc
Centers of Academic Excellence in Information
Assurance Education
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/academia/caeiae.cfm
Information Security Management Handbook
4th edition, Harold F. Tipton and Micki Krause
Auerbach publications, ISBN 1-8493-9829-0
IP–in-Space Security Handbook, September 2001
http://ipinspace.gsfc.nasa.gov/documents/
Satellite Encryption, John Vacca
Academic Press, ISBN: 0-12-710011-3

Plan for at least a one year schedule effect and is
spread throughout the development lifecycle. Use
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CONCLUSION
Now is the opportunity to do it securely. The
Small Satellite assets will definitely find their
place in our government inventory in new and
meaningful missions. We need to embrace the
principles of Information Assurance in Small
Satellite system architectures because of the laws
but more importantly, it is the right thing to do.
The focus is on the mission success where it needs
to be. Our new world order requires us to bake in
the security of the system as well as to insure that
our system can never be used against us in any
capacity. Think the unthinkable and how to
prevent it from ever happening and then it won’t.
Information Assurance is not new, however it is
ever expanding in our Information Age. Seek out
subject experts early. Embrace the fact that
Mission Success = Mission Secured.
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